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Abstract: In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which 
Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true 
fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within 
the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the 
cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to 
resituate it within a new philosophical context—that of the field of 
contemporary metaphysics—which will enable me to develop a 
true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-
fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered 
structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of 
explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Richard Swinburne (2004, 2010), Theism, 
the claim that there is a God, provides a true explanation of 
the existence of the universe and its features. Theism is thus 
taken by Swinburne and others to be the ultimate 
explanation for there being a universe, and it being 
conformed to simple natural laws that lead to the evolution 
of conscious and morally aware human agents. In this article, 
I seek to assess the extent to which Theism can also provide 
a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain 
entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, 
I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework 
and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context—
that of the field of contemporary metaphysics—which will 
enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the 
existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the 
various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, 
given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have in 
front of us a new abductive argument for the existence of 
God—specifically, an argument for God’s existence based 
on the fact of him being the best (fundamental) explanation 
for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that reside 
within the layered structure of reality.1 Hence, at the end of 
 
1 An abductive argument is a type of argument for the truth of a 
conclusion that employs ‘abductive reasoning’. Abductive 
reasoning is a form of reasoning that typically starts with a set of 
data and proceeds from this set, to the ‘best’ explanation for it, in 
accord with a certain explanatory criteria. Thus, the type of 
argument that will be formulated in this article is of this kind—
though it will be stated at an informal level. For a further 
explanation of the nature of abductive reasoning, and a 
comparison of this type of reasoning with that of deductive and 
inductive reasoning, see (Douven, 2021). 
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our exploratory journey, we will thus have one more good 
reason to believe in the existence of God. 
Plan: in section 2 ('Explanatory Framework'), I detail the 
nature of Swinburne's explanatory framework and resituate 
it within a metaphysical context. In section 3 (‘Explanatory 
Target'), I explain the specific explanatory target that is under 
focus—the existence of non-fundamental entities. In section 
4 ('Explanatory Analysis'), I assess Theism and two other 
candidate fundamental explanations of our explanatory 
target: Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism. Each of these 
explanations will be assessed in light of their fulfilment of 
the inductive criteria detailed in section 1, with the final 
conclusion being that Theism is the only explanation that 
fulfils this criteria—it is the simplest explanation, fitting with 
our background knowledge, that leads us to expect the data, 
when otherwise it would not be expected. Theism is thus the 
best candidate to be a fundamental explanation of the 
existence of the various non-fundamental entities that are 
part of the layered structure of reality. Finally, there will be a 
concluding section (‘Conclusion’) that will summarise the 
position that has been argued for in this article. 
  
 
2. Explanatory Framework 
 
2.1 Nature of Explanation 
 
The provision of an explanation, as noted by Swinburne 
(2004, 23), is an ambiguous exercise—it may refer, on the 
one hand, to someone having provided a true explanation of 
a phenomenon, or, on the other hand, it may mean that the 
person has merely provided a possible explanation of it. 
Nonetheless, when one is indeed seeking an explanation of 
the occurrence of a given phenomenon, they are certainly 
interested in arriving at a true, rather than simply a possible, 
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explanation of it. Thus, understanding the nature of a true 
explanation, rather than solely that of a possible explanation, 
will be our main focus. A true explanation, within a general 
causal context, is provided for the occurrence of some 
phenomenon (i.e. an event) when one states a set of factors 
that include within it a ‘cause’ (i.e. an object and the set of 
conditions in which it was operative) and the ‘reason’ that 
the cause was operative in the manner that it was.2  More 
fully, we can construe the nature of a true (general) 
explanation as such: 
 
(1) (General Explanation) An explanation is a true 
explanation of the occurrence of a given 
phenomenon when it invokes a what (i.e. a cause) 
that truly brought about the phenomenon and a 
why (i.e. a reason) that explains its 
efficaciousness.  
 
Once these factors are in place—the what and why—we have 
a true explanation for the occurrence of a particular event. 
More specifically, a true general explanation provides the 
correct answer to questions concerning what caused a 
particular event to occur and why that event occurred in the 
manner that it did. In addition to this, a general explanation 
is also focused on providing a diachronic explanation for the 
occurrence of a particular event by the invoking of a cause 
and a reason that were operative over a certain period of 
time. Moreover, within this particular explanatory 
framework, there are two kinds of explanation: inanimate 
explanation and personal explanation. An inanimate 
explanation is an explanation that invokes, first, an initial 
 
2 The word ‘general’ is only used here and below to distinguish this 
type of explanation from that of a metaphysical explanation. 
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state of affairs—which will include an operating cause—and 
second, some laws of nature—which are universal 
generalisations of the form ‘all A’s are so-and-so’ or ‘all A’s 
do so-and-so’—in order to explain the occurrence of a 
particular event (Swinburne, 2004, 26). More specifically, an 
inanimate explanation is distinctive in its inclusion of 
inanimate causation—and thus the what is the initial conditions 
that include the cause, and the why is the law of nature that 
was operative at the specific time in which the particular 
event occurred. Thus, for example, the occurrence of an 
explosion is explained by the ignition of a particular volume 
of gunpowder under certain conditions—which is the 
what—in combination with a generalisation that under such 
conditions ignited gunpowder explodes—which is the why 
(Swinburne, 2004, 26). Personal explanation, on the other 
hand, involves persons, their beliefs and purposes. More 
precisely, a personal explanation is distinctive in its inclusion 
of intentional causation—and so the what is the person, and the 
why are the beliefs, powers and purposes of that person. So, 
for example, the occurrence of a hand wave is explained by 
a person—which is the what—in combination with their 
power to wave their hand, their belief that waving their hand 
will catch the attention of someone, and their purpose of 
catching the attention of a certain individual—each of which 
constitute the why.  
Taken together, we thus have two kinds of explanation 
for the occurrence of a particular event—inanimate and 
personal explanation—which can then be understood to 
come in at least three different forms: partial explanation, full 
explanation and complete explanation. First, a partial 
explanation is a form of explanation that includes factors—
a cause and a reason—that only contributed to the bringing 
about the occurrence of the phenomena under question—
the factors made it physically probable that they would 
occur, yet these particular factors did not necessitate the 
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occurrence of the phenomena. For example, for an 
inanimate explanation, an individual contracting Huntington 
Disease is partially explained by their parent having had the 
disease. And, for a personal explanation, an individual having 
died from lung cancer is partially explained by them having 
smoked throughout their life. Within both kinds of 
explanation, the occurrence of the latter events only makes 
it probable but does not necessitate the occurrence of the 
former events. Second, a full explanation is a form of 
explanation that includes a set of factors—a cause and a 
reason—that were together sufficient for the occurrence of the 
phenomena—these set of factors are a ‘full cause’ of the 
phenomena and thus deductively entail, and really explain, 
its occurrence. For example, for an inanimate explanation, 
the occurrence of a high tide is fully explained by the sun, 
moon, earth, water, etc., being in certain positions and by the 
operation of Newton's laws (Swinburne, 2004, 78). And, for 
a personal explanation, a fridge door being left open is fully 
explained by an individual having opened it in order to get 
some food. Within both kinds of explanation, the occurrence 
of the former events is deductively entailed, and really 
explained by the occurrence of the latter events. Third, a 
complete explanation is a special form of full explanation 
that goes beyond this form by including within it a set of 
factors—a cause and a reason—of which there is no 
explanation (either full or partial) of their existence or 
operation in terms of contemporaneous factors that exist 
and are operative at the time of their existence or operation.3 
 
3 At a more specific level, this form explanation is a synchronic—
rather than diachronic—form of explanation. (Swinburne, 2004, 
n3) brings this out. However, as the causes invoked by this form 
of explanation are not simultaneous with their effects I will 
continue to class this form as a diachronic form of explanation.  
   Fundamentality and the Existence of God 7 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
In other words, the what and why—that is, the cause and the 
operative reason—do not have any further explanation for 
their existence or operation on the basis of 
contemporaneous factors—they serve as the terminus in 
explanation for a given phenomenon at a specific time. For 
example, for an inanimate explanation, the occurrence of a 
high tide is completely explained by the specific region of the 
universe being relatively empty of matter and the operation 
of Albert Einstein’s laws of General Relativity (Swinburne, 
2004, 78). And, for a personal explanation, an individual 
having formed the intention to get some food from the 
fridge is completely explained by their further intention to 
eat regular meals in order to survive. Within both kinds of 
explanation, the occurrence of the former event (or state) is 
deductively entailed, and really explained, by the occurrence 
of the latter event (or state), and of which there is no further 
explanation in the form of contemporaneous factors for the 
occurrence of the latter events (or states)—these factors are 
the terminus in explanation for that specific phenomenon at 
a given time.  
Now, this explanatory framework—that includes the 
different kinds and forms of a true explanation—can now 
also be extended into the metaphysical realm. However, in 
doing this, we also realise that with a true, general 
explanation, the provision of a metaphysical explanation is an 
ambiguous exercise as well. Yet, despite this ambiguity, a 
minimal understanding of a true metaphysical explanation, 
as noted by individuals such as Anna Sofia-Maurin (2019, 
1574), is that of it invoking entities and a non-causal 
explanatory connection, which accounts for the nature 
and/or existence of one entity with reference to another 
entity, that the former non-causally and synchronically 
depends upon. More precisely, and expounding this within 
our explanatory framework, we can construe the nature of a 
true metaphysical explanation as such: 
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(2) (Metaphysical Explanation) An explanation is a 
true metaphysical explanation of the nature 
and/or existence of a given entity when it 
invokes a what (i.e. a ground) that the entity non-
causally and synchronically depends upon and a 
why (i.e. a principle) that explains the reason for 
the dependence of the former entity on the latter 
entity.  
 
Once these factors are in place—the what and why—we have 
a true metaphysical explanation for the nature and/or 
existence of a given entity at a specific time. More 
specifically, a true metaphysical explanation provides the 
correct answer to questions of what determines or makes 
one entity exist and be what it is. Moreover, a metaphysical 
explanation, unlike a general explanation, is focused on 
providing a synchronic explanation for the constitutive 
generation of a dependent outcome at a specific point in 
time. And this is done by invoking an entity and a principle 
or, more specifically, following Jonathan Schaffer (2017, 
305), a ‘law of metaphysics’—which is simply that of a 
counterfactual-supporting general principle stating what 
builds or grounds what.4 Now, as with a general explanation, 
there are at least two possible kinds of metaphysical 
explanation: inanimate metaphysical explanation and personal 
metaphysical explanation. An inanimate metaphysical 
explanation is one that invokes an entity and a law of 
metaphysics in order to explain the nature and/or existence 
of another entity—the what is the former entity and the why 
is the holding of the law between it and the latter entity. 
Whilst, a personal metaphysical explanation is one that 
invokes an entity, the beliefs, powers and purposes of that 
 
4 More on the nature of building and grounding below. 
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entity and a law of metaphysics in order to explain the nature 
and/or existence of another entity—the what is the former 
entity and the why are the beliefs, powers and purposes of 
that entity and the holding of the law between it and the latter 
entity. In the metaphysical domain, and unlike in the general 
explanatory domain detailed above, inanimate and personal 
metaphysical explanations converge—that is, laws of 
metaphysics are present in both—where the only difference 
between these two different kinds of explanation is that a 
personal metaphysical explanation, and not an inanimate 
metaphysical explanation, includes the beliefs, powers and 
purposes of an entity as an explanatory factor for the 
constitutive generation of a dependent outcome.  
As with the general explanatory case, a metaphysical 
explanation of both kinds can come in three different forms. 
It can, first, be a partial metaphysical explanation, which is a 
form of metaphysical explanation that includes factors—an 
entity and a law of metaphysics—that another entity is only 
partially (non-causally and synchronically) dependent upon. 
For example, for an inanimate metaphysical explanation, the 
existence of an H2O molecule is partially explained by the 
existence of an h atom. And, for a personal metaphysical 
explanation, the existence of a musical harmony at a certain 
time is partially explained by the existence of one individual 
who is singing a note at that specific time. Within both kinds 
of explanation, the existence of the latter entities does not 
necessitate the existence of the former entities. Second, a full 
metaphysical explanation is a form of a metaphysical 
explanation that includes factors—an entity and a law of 
metaphysics—that another entity is fully (non-causally and 
synchronically) dependent upon—the entity (or entities) that 
constitutes a part of the explanatory set of factors is (or are) 
a ‘full ground’ of the other entity and thus deductively entail, 
and really explain, its existence. For example, for an 
inanimate metaphysical explanation, the existence of an H2O 
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molecule is fully metaphysically explained by the existence 
and arrangement of two h atoms and an O atom. And, for a 
personal metaphysical explanation, the existence of a musical 
harmony at a certain time is fully metaphysical explained by 
the existence of two individuals who are singing a note at 
that specific time. Within both kinds of explanation, the 
existence (and arrangement) of the latter entities deductively 
entails, and really explains, the existence of the former 
entities.  Third, a complete metaphysical explanation is a 
special form of metaphysical explanation that includes 
factors—an entity and a law of metaphysics—that another 
entity is fully (non-causally and synchronically) dependent 
upon, and which their existence is not (non-causally and 
synchronically) dependent upon another contemporaneously 
existing entity. In other words, the what and why—that is, the 
existence of the latter entity (and/or law)—is the fundamental 
reason for the former entity existing. So, given the 
importance of the notion of fundamentality for this form of 
explanation, we can now re-term a complete metaphysical 
explanation as a fundamental explanation. Thus, for example, 
and to pre-empt the main discussion of this article, for an 
inanimate fundamental explanation, it could be the case that 
the existence of non-fundamental entities is fundamentally 
explained by the existence of the Cosmos (or a collection of 
mereological atoms). Or, for a personal fundamental 
explanation, it could be the case that the existence of non-
fundamental entities is fundamentally explained by the 
existence of God. Within both kinds of explanation, the 
existence of the latter entities deductively entails, and really 
explains, the existence of the former entities, and of which 
there is no further explanation, in the form of 
contemporaneous, or, more fundamental factors, for the former 
entities existing as they do. Taking all of this into account, 
these are the different kinds and forms of explanation that 
are available within a non-metaphysical and metaphysical 
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context. The important question to be faced now then is: 
what are the justificatory grounds for one believing that they 
have acquired a true complete explanation for the 
occurrence of a given phenomenon or a fundamental 
explanation for the existence of a given entity? 
 
 
2.2 Justification of Explanation  
 
The justificatory grounds on which an explanation is judged 
to be a correct terminus in explanation—that is, how 
probable it is that this explanation is a complete or 
fundamental explanation of a particular event or entity—
centres on the extent to which it fulfils the following 
inductive criteria:5 
 
(i) The Criterion of Predictive Power   
(ii) The Criterion of Background Knowledge  
(iii) The Criterion of Scope  
(iv) The Criterion of Simplicity  
 
For (i): the Criterion of Predictive Power, this criterion 
assesses whether the postulated explanation predicts the 
occurrence of the event, or the existence of the entity, when 
otherwise this event or entity would not be expected to have 
occurred or to have existed. Importantly, however, as 
Swinburne (2004, 70) notes, the ability for an explanation (of 
 
5 Knowledge concerning the truth of this inductive criteria, 
according to Swinburne (2001, 122), is obtainable a priori. 
Furthermore, this criteria is taken to be at the heart of scientific 
and historical practice—that is, scientists and historians, according 
to Swinburne (2001, 74), regularly employ this inductive criteria in 
their investigations. 
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a general and metaphysical kind) to predict the data does not 
imply that this explanation has to do this in a literal sense (i.e. 
that the event or entities that constitute the data will be 
observed to have occurred or to exist in the future). Rather, 
an explanation is only required to provide a sufficient 
explanation for the data, whether or not this data was obtained 
in the past. For (ii): the Criterion of Background Knowledge, 
this criterion assesses whether the postulated explanation 
meshes with other explanations that are rendered probable 
by this inductive criteria. That is, an explanation fits with 
background knowledge if the causes or entities invoked by 
the explanation are similar to those causes or entities that are 
taken to exist within other neighbouring fields.6  
For (iii): the Criterion of Scope, this criterion assesses 
how much the postulated explanation seeks to explain. 
Generally, an explanation that seeks to explain more data is 
less probably true than one that is more restricted in its 
explanatory range. However, as Swinburne (2004, 56) sees it, 
this criterion is not to be given very much weight, since the 
 
6 Swinburne (2004, 60) sees the Criterion of Background 
Knowledge as being limited in its usage, in that it is only applicable 
to explanations that have a narrow scope as, according to 
Swinburne, the amount of evidence that reside within the 
background knowledge, with which a given explanation will need 
to fit will decrease the range of its scope. Thus, in Swinburne’s 
thought, there will not be any background knowledge that an 
explanation of enormous scope will need to fit with. In response 
to this, Herman Philipse (2012, 210-212) has argued that 
Swinburne’s reasoning in support of one eliminating the Criterion 
of Background Knowledge is fallacious—it is subject to the ‘fallacy 
of division’—and thus must be abandoned. Adjudicating this 
debate will take us to far afield, and thus going forward we will 
simply continue to maintain this specific inductive criterion for our 
analysis of the candidate fundamental explanations. 
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specific restrictions of the scope of an explanation are often 
arbitrary and complicated, and thus explanations that have a 
narrower scope are—although more probably true—
typically less simple than explanations of a much wider 
scope. Thus, given the importance of the Criterion of 
Simplicity, which is to be seen now, the Criterion of Scope 
is generally less important for determining the probable truth 
of an explanation. For (iv): the Criterion of Simplicity, this 
criterion assesses whether the postulated hypothesis is 
quantitatively and qualitatively simple. The quantitative and 
qualitative simplicity of an explanation is that of it 
postulating the fewest entities, fewest properties of entities, 
fewest kinds of entities, fewest kinds of properties, 
properties that are more readily observable, the fewest 
separate laws with the fewest terms relating the fewest 
variables, and the simplest formulation of each law being 
mathematically simple (Swinburne, 2004, 53). In following 
Schaffer (2015, 647),7 however, one will need to modify this 
criterion within a metaphysical context by focusing the 
quantitative and qualitative simplicity of an explanation on 
that of fundamental entities, principles or laws, rather than all 
types of entities, principles or laws. A probably true 
 
7 Schaffer (2015), in a similar manner to Swinburne, also sees the 
importance of the Criterion of Simplicity (or ‘Occam’s Razor’) for 
metaphysical theorising. However, Schaffer believes that one must 
also include a specific restriction to the range of the Razor, which 
is that of it only to being applicable to fundamental entities and/or 
properties—Schaffer terms this additional restriction the ‘Laser’. 
Interestingly, however, Schaffer’s Laser does not distinguish 
between quantitative and qualitative simplicity. Nevertheless, there 
is nothing inherent within the Laser that should stop one from 
making this distinction. 
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fundamental explanation is thus one that is quantitatively and 
qualitatively simple. The quantitative and qualitative 
simplicity of a fundamental explanation is thus that of it 
postulating the fewest fundamental entities, fewest 
properties of fundamental entities, fewest kinds of 
fundamental entities, fewest kinds of fundamental 
properties, fundamental properties that are more readily 
observable, the fewest separate metaphysical laws with the 
fewest terms relating the fewest variables and the simplest 
formulation of each metaphysical law being mathematically 
simple. Nevertheless, for both explanations—general and 
metaphysical—if an explanation posits the existence of some 
new particular object or properties, it is required by the 
Criterion of Simplicity that it should postulate as few as 
possible, and it should postulate no more than those that are 
needed to explain the observational data.  
This is the inductive criteria that provide justificatory 
grounds for holding to the probable truth of a particular 
explanation. Within both kinds of explanation, we seek the 
simplest explanation, fitting with our background 
knowledge, which leads us to expect the phenomena or 
entities that do in fact occur or exist, when otherwise this 
would not be expected. And the fulfilment of these criteria 
is the grounds for one determining the stopping point for a 
purported complete or fundamental explanation. Focusing 
our attention from here on fundamental explanations, a full 
metaphysical explanation of the existence of a collection of 
entities is a fundamental explanation, if we believe that the 
existence of the entities under question could only be 
explained further by postulating further full grounds acting 
contemporaneously with the entities, which do not have any 
more simplicity, greater fit with background knowledge and 
predictive power than the full grounds (and laws) featured in 
the former explanation—these full grounds would serve as 
the terminus of explanation. One would thus be justified in 
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taking a certain candidate explanation to be a fundamental 
explanation if one had reason to believe that any particular 
gain in the fulfilment of one of the inductive factors (i.e. 
simplicity, fit with background knowledge or predictive 
power) would be outweighed by a corresponding loss of 
another. Thus, for example, any attempt to provide an 
alternative explanation of the existence of a given entity 
would result in one postulating a more complex 
explanation—and thus, it fails to fulfil Criterion (iv)—with 
only a potentially marginal gain in predictive power (or fit 
with background knowledge). One is thus to move beyond the 
data, and the currently existing explanations of it, only if 
there is a possibility of a greater fulfilment of the inductive 
criteria, and that will be so if there is a potential explanation 
that is simpler and/or explains the data better, whilst still 
fitting with background knowledge. Thus, in regards to 
Theism, and whether it can serve as a fundamental 
explanation of a certain set of metaphysical data, one will 
need to establish whether Theism, relative to the data, 
sufficiently meets the inductive criteria. And if it does, given 
the nature that God is taken to have, he must serve as a 
fundamental explanation of this data. In short, once we 
establish that Theism is probably true—that is, it is the 
simplest explanation, fitting with our background 
knowledge, that led us to expect the data, when otherwise it 
would not be expected—then one has reached a terminus in 
explanation. So, the question that is now presented to us is: 
what is the nature of the particular phenomenon that we are 
seeking a fundamental explanation of? In other words, what 
is our explanatory target? And how does Theism and any 
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3. Explanatory Target 
 
3.1 Layered Structure of Reality 
 
The human quest for knowledge seeks a fundamental 
explanation for the existence of all dependent things—that 
entity or entities on which everything else depends for its 
nature and/or existence. As will be explained below, we 
certainly will need to acknowledge something as 
fundamental, and so the great metaphysical issue is 
understanding what exactly that is. There are at least two 
types of fundamental explanations available: an inanimate 
fundamental explanation and a personal fundamental 
explanation, each of which posits the existence and 
operation of fundamental entities that purportedly explain 
the existence of other dependent entities—that is, non-
fundamental entities—when otherwise these entities would 
not be expected to exist. More specifically, we can take the 
following phenomenon as our explanatory target: 
 
(3) (Explanatory Target) There are non-
fundamental entities, rather than none at all. 
 
This explanatory target captures certain phenomena whose 
existence require a further, more fundamental explanation. 
In the next section, we will map out the available candidate 
fundamental explanations and assess which of these 
candidates is most probably the correct one. Prior to that, it 
will be helpful to further sketch out the metaphysical picture 
and framework within which our explanatory target can be 
located. Specifically, it is an evident fact of reality that a 
variety of different things exist, ordered from the very large 
things (e.g. planets, stars and galaxies) passing through the 
more medium-sized things (e.g. flamingos, humans and 
buildings) to the very small things (e.g. quarks, protons and 
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neutrons). Some of these types of things are taken to be 
dependent entities that are, in some sense, less important 
than some other things within this structure. Flamingos, for 
example, appear to depend upon the existence of planets and 
stars—and all would agree, though flamingos are important 
as a species—without our planet and star existing in the here 
and now, flamingos will also not exist in the here and now, 
and not vice versa. Nonetheless, it is quite clear to most 
metaphysicians that the variety of content that makes up our 
reality is arranged into layers, or a hierarchy of levels: galaxies 
reside at the ‘top-level’ and thus are at a higher level than 
flamingos, that reside at the ‘middle-level’, which are 
themselves, in turn, at a higher level than quarks, that reside 
at the ‘bottom-level’ of this structure. Or, moving away from 
an ordering by size, and at a more scientific or categorial 
level, economics resides at the ‘top-level’, and is thus at a 
higher level than psychology, biology and chemistry,8 which 
reside at the ‘middle-level’, and thus are themselves, in turn, 
at a higher level than physics, which resides at the ‘bottom-
level’ of this specific structure. Reality is thus multi-layered 
with an increasing level of importance as you descend down 
its levels, or, as we will see below, as you ascend higher up 
its levels. So, given this layered view of reality, an important 
question that needs to be answered is: what makes a certain 
phenomenon higher (or lower) and thus less important (or 
more important) than another? A plausible answer to this 
question is that of each of the phenomena being connected 
and ordered by a relation of dependence and determination, 
which provides a basis for this hierarchical structure. Thus, 
focusing now on the scientific classificatory scheme: some 
phenomenon of economics: goods and services, is 
dependent upon, and determined by, some phenomenon of 
 
8 These categories are themselves ordered within this specific level. 
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psychology: the mind, which is dependent upon, and 
determined by, some phenomenon of biology: the brain, 
which is dependent upon, and determined by, some 
phenomenon of chemistry: matter or chemical states, which 
is dependent upon, and determined by, some phenomenon 
of physics: quarks. Given this hierarchical scheme, some 
metaphysicians take the categories residing within the lower 
levels of this structure (e.g. physics) to be more fundamental 
than those residing within the higher levels (e.g. biology and 
economics), with an explanation for the entities that exist in 
the higher levels ultimately terminating in the existence of an 
absolutely fundamental entity, or entities, that exist within the 
lower levels. An important question to be asked now is: what 
does it mean for something to be absolutely fundamental and 
more fundamental than another? 
 
 
3.2 Absolute & Relative Fundamentality 
 
In contemporary metaphysics, the notion of absolute 
fundamentality is used in reference to an entity (or entities) 
that is (or are) basic, primitive or rock-bottom in the 
hierarchical structure of reality. Two central aspects of the 
notion of absolute fundamentality, according to Karen 
Bennett (2017), are those of independence and completeness 
(with the former being more central to the notion than the 
latter).9 Given these two aspects, a distinctive 
conceptualisation of the notion of absolute fundamentality 
can be stated as such: 
 
 
9 For the reasons for privileging independence over completeness, 
see (Bennett, 2017, 122-123). 
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(4) (Fundamental) x is fundamental if x is 
independent and complete. 
 
In Bennett's thought, absolute fundamentality, construed as 
independence and completeness, is intimately tied to the 
further notion of building. Building is a technical term that 
ties together the following type of relations: composition, 
constitution, set-formation, realisation, micro-based determination, 
grounding and causation. These various relations are not 
intended by Bennett to be exhaustive but are instead 
relatively central notions that intuitively fit the mould of 
being a building-relation. How these paradigm relations fit 
this building mould is through them fulfilling the three 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of directedness, 
necessitation and generation. Firstly, the condition of 
directedness takes a building-relation to be antisymmetric, 
irreflexive and thus asymmetric. Secondly, the condition of 
necessitation takes builders to necessitate, in some sense, 
what they build. Thirdly, the condition of generation takes 
the built entities to exist in virtue of their builders, and thus 
the latter back an explanation for the former existing as they 
do (Bennett, 2017, 32). These necessary and sufficient 
conditions distinguish building-relations from other types of 
relations and provide a basis for the claim that building-
relations form a unified family (i.e. a natural resemblance 
class) despite the differences amongst them (Bennett, 2017, 
20). Off of the basis of this further explication of the notion 
of building, we can now construe the independence aspect 
of absolute fundamentality as such: 
 
(5) (Independence) x is independent if nothing 
builds x (Bennet, 2017). 
 
And we can now also construe the completeness aspect of 
absolute fundamentality as such: 
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(6) (Completeness) The set of the xxs is (or the 
xxs plurally are, or a non-set-like x is) 
complete at a world w just in case its 
members build (…) everything else at w 
(Bennett, 2017, 109). 
 
According to (Independence), absolutely fundamental 
entities are independent in the sense that they are unbuilt and 
thus do not depend on anything else. Moreover, for 
(Completeness), a certain set of absolutely fundamental 
entities are complete at a specific world in the sense that they 
build everything else in that world. That is, they are the things 
that ultimately account for everything else that does exist in 
that specific world. Absolute fundamentality, as expressed by 
(Fundamental) and further elucidated by (Independence) 
and (Completeness), reflects, as Bennett (2017, 111) notes, 
two halves of the familiar phrase 'unexplained explainers', 
the 'unexplained' part reflecting independence which says 
that nothing 'presses upwards' on them and the 'explainers' 
part reflecting completeness which says that a certain set of 
entities 'presses upwards' on everything else in a specific 
world. Furthermore, and more importantly, these two 
aspects are reducible to and defined by the notion of 
building. That is, within the building-fundamentality 
framework, there is thus a deflationism (or reductionism) 
about absolute fundamentality, where the fundamentality 
facts are simply the building facts (Bennett, 2017). Therefore, 
as Bennett notes, for certain fundamentality relations to 
obtain is simply 'for certain complex patterns of building to 
obtain' (Bennett, 2017, 139). In short, there is an 
identification of absolute fundamentality with building. 
Thus, the state of affairs of an entity being absolutely 
fundamental is that of them being independent and 
complete, which is reducible to the entity being, on the one 
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hand, unbuilt and, on the other hand, part of a set at a world 
whose members build everything else in that specific world. 
However, it is important to remember that there is not a 
single, general relation of building. Rather there are a 
different number of building-relations that form a unified 
family. Thus, when the term 'building' is used in a singular 
sense, it is simply a generalisation about a class of relations 
(Bennett, 2017, 3). Therefore, absolute fundamentality, 
construed as independence and completeness, is to be 
indexed to particular building-relations. Hence, in indexing 
absolute fundamentality to particular building-relations, to 
be absolutely fundamental is to be independent and 
complete, which, for the former, is ultimately reducible to 
either not being composed, or constituted, or realised, or 
determined, or grounded, or caused, by anything else—an 
absolutely fundamental entity does not feature as an output 
of a particular building-relation (Bennett, 2017, 112). 
Whereas, for the latter, it is ultimately reducible to being a 
member of a set of entities at a world whose members 
compose, or constitute, or realise, or determine, or ground, 
or cause everything else, in that specific world—the set of 
absolutely fundamental entities builds, in one of the above 
ways, everything else (Bennett, 2017, 112). Thus, there are 
various real distinctions between the indexed versions of 
absolute fundamentality.10 Focusing our attention now on 
one particular building-relation: grounding, we can see that 
this relation is regularly characterised as a primitive 
expression of dependence, determination or explanation. 
This expression has been championed by ‘grounders’ (i.e. 
grounding theorists) such as Kit Fine (2012), Jonathan 
Schaffer (2009a and 2016) and Gideon Rosen (2010), 
 
10 From this point on I will alternate between the term ‘absolutely 
fundamental’ and ‘fundamental’ without any change in meaning. 
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amongst others,11 and is typically introduced by paradigm 
example(s) such as the following: 
 
(7) (Paradigm) Singleton-Socrates exists in virtue of the 
existence of Socrates. 
 
 What is of concern in this example for grounders, is not so 
much the truth value of the claim, but rather the fact that the 
connecting 'in virtue’ clause (and others like it) expresses 
some form of ontological priority that is related to 
'determination', 'dependence' or 'explanation'. However, in 
explicating the nature of this ontological priority and the 
character of this expression, grounders usually focus on 
detailing the specific formal principles, modal pattern, 
explanatory and generative roles, and the analogous 
relationship to other relations which grounding has, which all 
help to further demystify it. So, in following this 
demystification procedure, we can see that the consensus for 
grounders is that grounding, in its standard ‘full’ variety:12 
 
(8) (Full) A given x is the ground of y if x on its 
own is sufficient to ground y. 
 
 is, firstly, governed by the following three formal 
principles: 13 
 
11 For a historical explanation of these individuals’ roles in 
developing the notion of ground, see (Raven, 2020). 
12 For a further detailing of this variety of ground, and the other 
varieties of ground such as the partial, immediate, mediate, weak 
and strict varieties, see (Fine, 2012, 51-53). 
13 However, all of these formal principles are indeed controversial. 
Thus, firstly, for issues with asymmetry, see (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 
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(9) (Irreflexivity) No x is grounded in itself. 
(10) (Asymmetry) If x grounds y, then y does not ground x.  
(11) (Transitivity) If x grounds y, and y grounds z, then x 
grounds z. 
 
And, secondly, grounding is also generally taken to be 
governed by the following principles that express a modal 
pattern: 14 
 
(12) (Non-monotonicity) If x grounds y, it does 
not follow that y is grounded by x and any 
other fact (or entity) r. 
(13) (Hyperintensionality) If x grounds y, it does 
not follow that x grounds any fact (or entity) 
that is intensionally equivalent to y. 
(14)  (Necessitarianism) If x grounds y, then x 
necessitates y. 
 
Thus, given the formal principles, grounding induces a strict 
partial order over the entities that are in its domain (Trogdon, 
2013).15 That is, grounding gives rise to a hierarchy of 
 
2015). Secondly, for issues with irreflexivity, see (Jenkins, 2011). 
Thirdly, for issues with transitivity, see (Schaffer, 2012).  
14 Firstly, for an explanation of the non-monotonicity of ground, 
see (Audi, 2012). Secondly, for an explanation of the 
hyperintensionality of ground, see (Jenkins, 2011). Thirdly, for an 
extended explanation of necessitarianism, see (Trogdon, 2013). 
And for issues with it, see (Leuenberger, 2013). For a defense of it, 
see (Cameron, 2008). 
15 For arguments against ground being a ‘strict’ order, see 
(Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2015). For a defense of ground as a ‘strict’ 
order, see (Raven, 2015).  
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grounds, in which the grounds of a fact (or entity), as 
Johannes Korbmacher notes, ‘rank ‘strictly below’ the fact (or 
entity) itself’ (Korbmacher, 2018, 161, parenthesis added). 
And, given the principles that express a modal pattern, 
grounding entails a necessary dependence of the grounded on 
the grounds, in that the existence of the latter entails the 
existence of the former. In short, grounders guarantee what 
they ground (Trogdon, 2013). However, they perform this 
necessitating action in a ‘fine-grained’, rather than a ‘coarse-
grained’ manner, in that they do not necessarily ground other 
superfluous entities as well. Thus, grounding, in its most basic 
construal, is an expression that conveys some form of 
directedness and necessitation. However, to aid us in our 
precisification task, it will be helpful to now narrow our focus 
to unpacking a specific ground-theoretic framework that has 
played an influential role within the contemporary literature, 
that of Jonathan Schaffer’s grounding theory. Within this 
theory proposed by Schaffer, grounding is best modelled as a 
primitive ‘directed-dependency’ relation associated with the notion 
of ontological priority. This directed-dependency relation 
takes in terms from any arbitrary ontological category and 
links a more fundamental input to a less fundamental output 
(Schaffer, 2016). 16 Thus, according to Schaffer (2009a), there 
is an ontological ordering within reality, in that some entities 
are derivative of other, more fundamental entities. The 
fundamental entities of reality ontologically undergird the 
derivative entities and grounding is the relation that connects 
the undergirding entity to entities that are at a higher level in 
the structure of reality. Thus, within this perspective, there is 
a hierarchical view of reality that is ordered by priority in 
 
16 For a different, but highly influential conception of ground, that 
does not take it to be a relation, but a sentential operator that has 
facts within its purview, see (Fine, 2012). 
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nature. Once one distinguishes more from less fundamental 
entities, it is natural to posit a relation linking certain more 
fundamental entities to certain less fundamental entities 
which derive their existence from them (Schaffer, 2016, 145). 
Grounding is thus the name of this direct 'linkage' which is 
governed by the above formal and modal principles, connects 
the more to the less fundamental entities and thereby imposes 
a hierarchical structure over what there is (Schaffer, 2009a). 
Now, closely related to ground’s ability to structure reality are 
two further roles that it serves: its explanatory and generative 
roles, which are captured by the following principles: 
 
(15)  (Separatism) If x grounds y, x backs an 
explanation for y. 
(16)  (Super-Internality) If x grounds y, then y exists 
and has its intrinsic nature in-virtue of x and Rxy 
obtains in-virtue of x. 
 
First, for the explanatory principle of ‘separatism’,17 
explanation tracks grounding, and grounding, in some sense, 
backs explanation. Grounding entails the explicability of the 
grounded on the basis of its grounds and thus serves the role 
of providing a synchronic metaphysical explanation for the nature 
and/or existence of a less fundamental entity on the basis of the 
nature and/or existence of another, more fundamental entity 
(Schaffer, 2016).  Thus, the grounds provide an explanation for the 
grounded—grounding is thus a relation that is intimately tied 
to explanation. Secondly, for the generative principle of ‘super-
internality’, grounding is super-internal in the sense that the 
existence and intrinsic nature of one of the relatum ensure, 
 
17 Another view within the literature is that of 'unionism' which 
identifies ground with explanation. For a statement of this view, 
see (Raven, 2015, 326) and (Maurin, 2019, 1578). 
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firstly, that the grounding relation obtains and, secondly, that 
the other relatum (or relata) exists with the intrinsic nature that 
it has (Schaffer, 2016).18 Thus, as there is a generation of the 
grounded from the grounds, once there is a fixing of the intrinsic 
nature of the grounds, there is also a fixing of the intrinsic 
nature of what is grounded. This emphasises the fact that the 
existence of the grounds is sufficient to account for the 
grounded—grounding is thus a relation that is generative by 
nature.  
Consequently, given the fulfilment of these explanatory 
and generative roles, grounding thus provides the direction 
and linkage needed for metaphysical explanation and 
generation in a manner that is similar to way in which 
causation provides the direction and linkage needed for 
causal explanation and generation. More specifically, we can 
say that as the relation of causation links the world across 
time (i.e. causes are diachronically linked to their ‘generated’ 
effects),19 the relation of grounding links the world across 
levels (i.e. grounds are synchronically linked to the ‘generated’ 
(grounded) effects) (Schaffer, 2016). Thus, as a directed-
dependency relation, grounding has many important features 
in common with causation, which leads one to infer that the 
best explanation of this striking similarity is that of grounding 
being a type of causation: metaphysical causation (i.e. Grounding 
 
18 That grounding is super-internal was first posited by (Bennett, 
2011, 32-33). Furthermore, grounding’s super-internality is not to 
be confused with the internality of other relations. As the former 
type of internality, and not the latter, requires that only one of the 
relatum exists in order for the relation to hold between the relata.  
19 This view of causation assumes an intimate link between 
causation and laws of nature. For an alternative view that posits 
the possibility of scientific explanation/causation being expressed 
without laws of nature, see (Swinburne, 2004, 34). 
   Fundamentality and the Existence of God 27 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
is identical to metaphysical causation). That is, following 
Alastair Wilson (2018),20 we can take the grounding relation 
to be a special case of the causal relation where, as Wilson 
(2018, 724) notes, 'whenever A grounds B, A is a 
(metaphysical) cause of B and B is a (metaphysical) effect of 
A'. Metaphysical causation and nomological causation, are thus 
different species of the same genus: causation, such that, for 
the former, once one (again) distinguishes the more from the 
less fundamental, it is quite natural to posit an explanatorily-
backing, generative relation of metaphysical causation, which 
leads us to the following final principle: 
 
(17)   (Causation) If x grounds y, then x causes y such 
that y is a generated ‘effect’ of x, as mediated by the 
principles of grounding and aptly modelled by 
Structural Equation Modelling. 
 
The systematic analogy between grounding (i.e. metaphysical 
causation) and causation (i.e. nomological causation) centres 
on the manner in which the causal sufficiency relation is mediated 
within a causal and grounding context. More precisely, if laws 
of nature mediate a given instance of the causal sufficiency 
relation, then it is a case of nomological causation—for 
example, the throwing of a stone is a sufficient nomological 
cause of the breaking of a window, as this causal relation is 
mediated by laws of nature. Whereas if the (law-like) principles 
 
20 In following Wilson in taking grounding to be identical to 
causation—metaphysical causation—we part ways with Schaffer 
who takes grounding to be analogous to, but distinct from, 
causation. For the reasons why Schaffer does not make this 
identification, see (Schaffer, 2016, 94–96). And for a summary of 
reasons why someone should make this identification, see (Wilson, 
2018, 748). 
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of grounding fulfil the role of mediating a given instance of the 
causal sufficiency relation, then it is a case of metaphysical 
causation—for example, the existence of Socrates is a 
sufficient metaphysical cause of the existence of Singleton-
Socrates, as this causal relation is mediated by the (law-like) 
principles of grounding.21 Grounding (i.e. metaphysical 
causation) and nomological causation are thus simply different 
ways for the causal relation to be mediated and thus obtain 
(Wilson, 2018).  
Now, this species similarity between grounding and 
causation can be further elucidated through the use of the 
prominent formal framework of Structural Equation Models, 
which were developed within a causal context by individuals 
such as Judea Pearl (2009) and James Woodward (2003).22 
The primary advantage of Structural Equation Models, 
according to Schaffer (2016, 60), is that of them providing 
the most precise method for detailing directed-dependency 
relationships between entities. Hence, in a directed-
dependency relationship, we have the sources (i.e. causes, 
grounds) via a link (i.e. causal law, grounding principle) 
generating a result (i.e. effect, derivative) which can be aptly 
modelled by the input-function-output structure of Structural 
Equation Modelling (Schaffer, 2021, 176). Thus, taking 
 
21 Wilson (2018, 1-2) is more instructive than Schaffer (2016) in 
highlighting the importance of the different ways that the directed-
dependency relation is mediated. Furthermore, Schaffer (2016, 57) 
uses the terms ‘laws of metaphysics’ rather than ‘principles of 
grounding’ (or ‘grounding principles’) which feature in a later 
article (Schaffer, 2021). We can thus take both of these terms to be 
synonymous and in continue using the latter. 
22 Though more limited than Structural Equation Models, directed 
graphs are also helpful in modelling directed-dependency relations. 
For an explanation of this, see (Schaffer, 2016, 63). 
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(Paradigm) as a grounding test case, in the first stage, a 
Structural Equation Model starts with a representation of the 
system under study, which is then divided into sets of 
independent and dependent variables. The independent and 
dependent variables (in this case, Socrates and Singleton) are 







In the second stage, one then implements the functions given 
the ‘dynamics’ of the system, where, according to (Schaffer, 
2021, 177), there is a linking of the dependent variables by 
the function that maps the values of the input variables to 
their output value (where ‘<=’ is to be read as ‘is the output 
of’ (i.e. ‘Singleton is the output of the set-formation function 
on Socrates’):  
Functions: {(Singleton) <=set-formation(Socrates)}. 
Finally, in the last stage, one simply needs to evaluate the 
‘fundamentality conditions’,23 by assigning values to the 
independent variables according to what actually happened 
in reality:  
Assignment: {(Socrates)=1}. 
By {(Socrates)=1} being the case in reality, one can derive 
the result of {(Singleton)=1} for the respective model. 
Utilising a Structural Equation Model in this way enables one 
to ascertain a viable synchronic metaphysical explanation for 
why Singleton Socrates exists, from the existence of Socrates, 
 
23 In a causal model these conditions would be the initial 
conditions, rather than the fundamentality conditions that are 
featured in a grounding model. 
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via the dependence function that captures the grounding 
principles (or more specifically, the set-formation 
principle).24 That is, given that Socrates exists (Socrates=1) 
and the principles of grounding (set-formation) are at work, 
it is no coincidence that the Singleton-Socrates exists as well 
(Singleton=1). Singleton-Socrates is the output of this 
principle on the input of Singleton ((Singleton) <=set-
formation(Socrates)), leading to an explanation for Singleton 
Socrates’ existence (Schaffer, 2021). Thus, a Structural 
Equation Model expresses how grounding, as a metaphysical 
causation relation, provides the directed connection needed 
for explanation and induces a hierarchical structural 
relationship that stems from a more fundamental source (e.g. 
Socrates’s existence) via a link (e.g. the set-formation 
principle) to a generated, less fundamental  result (Singleton-
Socrates’ existence). Therefore, in a grounding relationship, 
the more fundamental input generates and provides an 
explanation for the less fundamental output analogously to 
how a (nomological) cause generates an effect and provides 
an explanation for its occurrence—grounding is thus a 
metaphysical causation relation.25 
Given this construal of grounding, as a directed, 
necessitating, generative and explanatory metaphysical 
causation relation, we can now further elucidate the notion 
of fundamentality in light of this concept, and restate 
(Fundamentality) in its indexed format as such: 
 
 
24 The set-formation principle would be a specific application of 
the grounding principles within a set-theoretic context. 
25 For brevity’s sake, I will now no longer refer to grounding as 
metaphysical causation and simply assume that grounding within 
this framework is to be identified as a (metaphysical) causal 
relation. 
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(18)  (FundamentalG) x is fundamental if x is 
independentG and completeG. 
 
In unpacking this, we, firstly, can state the indexed version of 
(Independence) as such: 
 
(19)  (IndependenceG) x is independent if 
nothing grounds x. 
 
And, secondly, we can state the indexed version of 
(Completeness) also as such: 
 
(20)  (CompletenessG) The set of the xxs is (or 
the xxs plurally are, or a non-set-like x is) 
complete at a world w just in case its 
members ground everything else at w. 
 
According to (FundamentalityG), as further elucidated by 
(IndependenceG) and (CompletenessG), an entity is 
fundamental if it is ungrounded (i.e. not grounded by any 
other entity) and is a member of a set of entities at a world 
whose members ground everything else in that specific 
world. Whereas an entity is derivative, that is non-
fundamental (i.e. dependent and non-complete), if 
something grounds it and/or it is not a member of a set of 
entities at a world whose members ground everything else in 
that specific world.26 In further precisifying this connection 
between fundamentality and grounding, we can apply the 
various grounding principles within this framework resulting 
in the nature of a fundamental entity being as follows: 
 
 
26 For brevity, the additional clause ‘in that specific world' will now 
be an unwritten assumption. 
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Directed  This entity does not 
rank below any other 
entity in the 
hierarchical 
structure of reality. 
This entity is part of a set that ranks 
higher than any other entity in the 
hierarchical structure of reality 
within the specific world in which 
this set exists. 
Necessitating  The existence of 
another entity does 
not necessitate the 
existence of this 
entity. 
This entity is part of a set that 
necessitates the existence of every 
other entity within the specific 
world in which this set exists. 
Generative  This entity’s 
existence and 
intrinsic nature are 
not fixed by the 
existence and 
intrinsic nature of 
any other entity. 
This entity is part of a set whose 
existence fixes the existence and 
intrinsic nature of every other entity 
within the specific world in which 
this set exists. 
Explanatory  This entity’s 
existence, at a 
specific time, is not 
explained by the 
existence of any 
other entity. 
This entity is part of a set that, at a 
specific time, explains the existence 
of all other entities within the 
specific world in which this set 
exists. 
Causal  This entity is not a 
grounded effect of 
any other entity and 
thus is not the 
output of a 
Structural Equation 
Model. 
This entity is part of a set that is the 
metaphysical cause of other entities, 
which are grounded effects, and 
thus is the input of a Structural 
Equation Model within the specific 
world in which this set exists. 
 
Table 1. 1 Fundamentality Principles 
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A fundamental entity is thus one that is not an output of a 
grounding relation; rather, it ultimately serves as the ground 
of everything else. For a fundamental entity, nothing presses 
upwards on it; instead, it serves the role of pressing upwards 
on all other (non-fundamental) entities—it is a basic feature 
of the hierarchical structure of reality (Bennett, 2017, 111).  
Closely related to the notion of absolute fundamentality 
just detailed is that of the further notion of relative 
fundamentality. Relative fundamentality, according to Bennett 
(2017, 40), is best characterised, like absolute fundamentality, 
in terms of building. That is, relative fundamentality lacks 
metaphysical depth through being nothing over and above 
patterns of building—it is a notion that is reducible to 
building and the various relations that constitute this 
resemblance class. Given this reduction (or deflation), one 
can thus, as Bennett (2017, 164) notes, provide conditions 
for the notion of relative fundamentality which, indexed to 




Than)     x is 
more 
fundamental 
than y = df 
either 
(i) fewer grounding steps from an 
ungrounded entity than y is, or 
(ii) x at least partially grounds y, or  
(iii) x stands in the ancestral of a 
grounding relation to y, or  
(iv) x is ungrounded and y is not, or  
(v) x belongs to some kind K and y 
belongs to some kind K* such that 
(a) neither K nor K* includes both 
grounded and ungrounded 
members, and (b) y does not belong 
to K and x does not belong to K*, 
and (c) members of K typically or 
normally ground members of K*.  
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These five sufficient conditions of relative fundamentality are 
to be viewed as a disjunction where an entity can be more 
fundamental than another entity through satisfying any of the 
above conditions. Thus, focusing on (ii), any entity that is in 
(at least a partial) grounding relationship with another entity 
is more fundamental than that entity—that is, if one thing 
grounds another, then the former thing is more fundamental 
than the latter. Grounds are more fundamental than what they 
ground. Hence, for an entity to be more fundamental than 
another entity is simply for it to fulfil the role of being that 
entity's (partial) grounds. Taking these two notions of 
fundamentality into account, we can now further precisify the 
layered structure of reality introduced earlier. 
       
  
3.3 Metaphysical Foundationalism 
 
Reality is hierarchically arranged with chains of entities 
being ordered by the building relations of grounding. And 
thus, the entities in this hierarchical structure that are taken 
to be the input of these grounding relations are more 
fundamental than the entities that are taken to be the output 
of these relations. These grounding chains, according to this 
metaphysical picture—termed metaphysical foundationalism—
terminates in something(s) that is itself absolutely 
fundamental.27 So, with the (building based) notions of 
absolute and relative fundamentality to hand, we can slot this 
 
27 The thesis of metaphysical foundationalism is sometimes 
mistakenly confused with the more controversial notion of the 
well-foundedness of grounding. For an explanation of the latter 
and the importance of distinguishing both notions, see (Dixon, 
2016) and (Rabin and Rabern, 2016). 
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notion into the layered conception of reality detailed above, 





















Fig 1. 1 Layered Structure of Reality 
 
This is the content and structure of reality, but the important 
question for our specific task is: why do any of these entities 
exist rather than not? A quick and easy answer would be that 
each of these entities exists in virtue of the entities that are 
more fundamental than them—that is, they exist because of 
the lower-level entities grounding their existence. This is 
indeed a sufficient explanation, as the existence of the lower-
level entities, and the holding of the relation of grounding, 
necessitates the existence of the higher-level entities. So with 
each level that we descend, plausibly, we have a full 
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metaphysical explanation that is provided by a more 
fundamental entity at a lower level. For example, the 
existence of a given human being is grounded by the 
existence of their more fundamental chemical states, and the 
existence of their more fundamental chemical states are, in 
turn, grounded by some more fundamental quarks, which are 
then taken to exist as absolutely fundamental entities—they 
are independent and complete. So, we have a full 
metaphysical explanation being provided within this chain—
that is, the existence of each of the entities in this chain has 
really been explained. Yet, despite having this type of 
explanation for each of the entities along this chain, one can 
ask why the terminus in explanation should stop there? Why 
can we not go beyond the constitutive quarks of the human 
being to something more fundamental and then continue 
proceeding on downwards potentially ad infinitum? In short, 
why must we posit the existence of an absolutely 
fundamental entity that serves the role of being a terminus 
of explanation? Instead of holding to some form of 
metaphysical infinitism—resulting in the reality being ‘turtles all 
the way down’?28 Well, why we seemingly must do this is 
because, despite having an explanation for each of the 
entities along this chain, what we do not have, as Ricki Bliss 
(2019, 370-373), has noted in a similar context, is that of an 
explanation for why there are any non-fundamental entities 
whatsoever. That is, given that a non-fundamental entity is, by 
definition, a dependent entity, we seem to require an 
explanation for it existing rather than not existing. And 
simply invoking a more fundamental entity than the one that 
is under focus (e.g. the chemical state and quarks for the 
 
28 Metaphysical infinitism is the view that are, or might be, infinitely 
descending chains of grounding, for a further explanation and 
defense of this view, see (Morganti, 2014). 
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existence of a given human) does not provide the needed 
explanation, so long as the more fundamental entities in the 
chain are themselves non-fundamental. Our explanatory 
target—the fact that there are any non-fundamental entities 
whatsoever—is in need of an explanation. Yet, no non-
fundamental entity can explain why there are any non-
fundamental entities whatsoever—none of these entities is 
adequate for the task at hand. And this inadequacy is seen 
quite clearly with the holding of what Bliss (2019, 373) terms, 
the kind-instantiation principle,29 which is stated as follows: 
 
(22)   (Kind Instantiation) Where K is any substantial 
kind, you can’t explain why there are any Ks at 
all by invoking only Ks, even if our explanation 
goes on forever. 
 
Given the kind-instantiation principle, and taking ‘non-
fundamental entity’ to be a substantial kind, one cannot thus 
explain why there are any non-fundamental entities, rather 
than none, by invoking only non-fundamental entities, even 
if one’s explanation goes on forever. That is, as no member of 
a kind can explain why that kind is instantiated in the first place, one 
must move beyond the collection of non-fundamental entities 
in order to explain why there are non-fundamental entities 
 
29 The following principle assumes a ‘weak’ version of the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason (PSR), such as one stated by Bliss (2019, 375) 
that is saddled to dependence:  
 
(PSR) Every dependent fact has an explanation. 
 
For the specific reasons for and against this particular construal of 
the PSR, see (Bliss, 2019, 374-376). 
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whatsoever. We thus require a terminus in explanation to 
account for the existence of non-fundamental entities, which 
is itself inexplicable and thus is not a dependent link within 
the explanatory chain of the hierarchical structure of reality. 
In short, the explanatory target noted above—of there 
existing non-fundamental entities, rather than none at all—
seeks an explanation provided by the existence of an 
absolutely fundamental entity (or entities).  
Now, as noted above, there are at least two possible kinds 
of fundamental explanation: inanimate fundamental 
explanation and personal fundamental explanation. 
Candidate explanations that fall into either of these kinds will 
need to be assessed by the inductive criteria for assessing 
proposed explanations that was introduced in the previous 
section. Importantly, however, when one is considering 
explanations of the existence of all of the non-fundamental 
entities that feature in the layered structure of reality, each of 
these hypotheses will be of enormous scope. Therefore, 
unless we are to dismiss these and all other potential 
fundamental explanations, Criterion (iii) will need to be left 
out of our assessment. Thus, any candidate fundamental 
explanation under question will need to be assessed by 
Criterion (i), (ii) and (iv), which boils down to a candidate for 
a fundamental explanation, in this specific context, being 
most likely the true one, if it is the simplest explanation, 
fitting with our background knowledge, which predicts the 
existence of non-fundamental entities, when we would not 
otherwise expect to find them. Given this framework and 
our exposition of our explanatory target, it will be important 
to now turn our attention to unpacking the inanimate and 
personal explanatory candidates for a fundamental 
explanation, and then, off of this, we can make an 
assessment of which one, according to our inductive criteria, 
deserves to be crowned as the fundamental explanation that 
the human quest for knowledge has been seeking. 
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4. Explanatory Analysis 
 
4.1 Nature of the Candidates 
 
In contemporary metaphysics, three candidates for a 
fundamental explanation for our explanatory target present 
themselves: Theism, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism. For 
the latter two: Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism—each 
of which is a candidate inanimate fundamental 
explanation—we have two physics-based explanations that 
support the commonly held view that whatever is at the 
fundamental layer of reality, and thus is the terminus in 
explanation for everything above (or below it), is of a 
physical nature—in short, everything bottoms out at the feet 
of a physical entity (or entities). Whereas, for the former: 
Theism—which is a candidate personal fundamental 
explanation—we have a theologically-based explanation that 
supports a view that the fundamental layer of reality, and 
terminus in explanation for everything above (or below it), is 
of a non-physical nature—in short, everything bottoms out 
at the feet of a non-physical fundamental entity. So, these are 
the three candidate explanations of the existence for the 
various non-fundamental entities that fill up the levels of our 
layered structure of reality. And thus it these candidate 
fundamental explanations that will need be assessed for their 
veracity according to our inductive criteria. However, prior 
to performing this assessment, it will be helpful to now 
briefly detail the nature of the entities that are posited by 
these explanations. We can turn our attention first to that of 
Theism and then after this we can focus on the other two 
alternative candidates. 
The theistic explanation centres around the simple claim 
that ‘there is a God’. This claim is a personal metaphysical 
explanation—it seeks to provide an explanation that invokes 
the powers, beliefs and intentions of a personal agent—and 
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it is a claim that is at the heart of the major theistic world 
religions such as: Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism. 
Now, there are various ways to construe this particular claim; 
however, the specific way that it will be construed here is as 
follows:30 
 
(23)  (Theism) There is a God: a metaphysically 
simple, omnipotence-trope. 
 
This specific rendering of Theism centres around the notion 
of a ‘powerful trope’—a powerful abstract particular nature of a 
modifier or modular kind—which has been introduced and 
defended by various ‘trope theorists’ such as D.C. Williams 
(1953), Keith Campbell (1990), Anna Sofia-Maurin (2002) 
and George Molnar (2003), among others. In breaking this 
concept down in a stepwise manner, we can understand that: 
first, a trope is abstract, not in the sense that it lacks 
spatiotemporality, but in the sense that it is ‘less than its 
 
30 In Swinburne’s (2004, 93-96) conception of theism, God is, 
amongst other things, an essentially, everlastingly omnipotent, 
bodiless spirit. This conception of God has been challenged by 
individuals such as Herman Philipse (2012, 205) who argues that 
the notion of a bodiless spirit fails to fit with our background 
knowledge concerning the type of entities that are taken to exist in 
neighbouring fields. Given this issue, Criterion (ii) is not met by 
Swinburne’s conception of Theism. However, as explained 
previously, Swinburne (2004, 66) does not see Criterion (ii) as 
being overly important for explanations of a wide explanatory 
scope, and thus does not see this to be a problem. Nonetheless, 
the present construal of God does not succumb to this issue, given 
the widely held assumption amongst philosophers concerning the 
existence of tropes, and thus Criterion (ii) can be met by Theism 
so construed. This widely held assumption will be further 
explained below. 
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content’ and does not ‘exhaust its plime’—in short, multiple 
tropes can be co-located together to form a compresent 
bundle. For example, a shape-trope that a table possesses is 
abstract because it does not exhaust its content, as other 
tropes, such as a colour-trope and a mass-trope, are also 
collocated with the shape-trope by occupying the same 
content (i.e. the table). However, in contrast, the table would 
be concrete by itself exhausting its content and thus not allowing 
another table (or object) to also occupy this content 
(Williams, 1953). Second, a trope is particular in the sense 
that it can have a distinct duplicate—in other words, 
Leibniz’s Law (i.e. the identity of indiscernibles) fails to hold 
for it.31 That is, for properties as universals, the Law holds, 
in that exactly similar entities (i.e. universals) are identical (i.e. 
if universal x and universal y are indiscernible, then x = y). 
Whereas for particulars (e.g. tropes), the principle does not 
hold, as exactly similar entities can be distinct (i.e. if trope x 
and trope y are indiscernible, then x ≠ y). For example, a 
shape-trope is particular because it is possible that there is a 
duplicate of this shape, that is, an entity that is exactly similar, 
but also distinct from this shape. In short, a trope is 
particular if it can have a duplicate. Third, a trope is its 
intrinsic (qualitative) nature, in that it does not have, or possess, 
a nature of its own; rather, it is combinatorially intrinsic in 
the sense that the nature of a trope is invariant under the 
scenarios in which the given trope is alone or accompanied 
(Alvarado, 2019, 554). However, the modal invariance of a 
trope, unlike other entities, is not grounded upon the 
possession of an intrinsic nature, but that of it being its 
 
31 Leibniz’s Law, which is often conceptualised as the principle of 
the indiscernibility of identicals, is conceived of here as its 
converse—the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which can 
be stated formally as such: ∀φ(φ(x) ↔ φ(y) → x = y). 
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intrinsic nature—it is numerically identical to it. There is 
nothing more to a trope than its nature, and thus, as noted 
by Anna-Sofia Maurin (2018, §2.2), tropes, at a general level, 
‘have no constituents, in the sense that they are not ‘made 
up’ or ‘built’ from entities belonging to some other category’. 
Tropes are thus primitively qualitative and irreducible 
entities—they lack proper-parts,32 and thus are 
metaphysically simple entities.33 Fourth, a trope can come in 
two forms: as a modifier or as a module trope. The central 
difference between a modifier trope and a module trope is 
that of the former being a singly (or minimally) characterising 
property, whilst the latter is a singly (or minimally) charactered 
property in a ‘stretched’ (or analogical) sense— it is a 
‘propertied thing or object’, where an object is a countable, 
property-bearing particular that has determinate existence 
and identity conditions and is not borne or possessed by 
anything else.34 In other words, a modifier trope is a property 
that does not exemplify this character, but simply bestows it 
upon (i.e. ‘makes’) something else to be charactered in that 
specific way. Thus, for example, a particular object is 
spherical in virtue of its modifier trope, which ‘spherises' that 
object by simply making it spherical without it sharing in that 
character as well. The character grounding provided by a 
modifier trope is thus de novo (or sui generis) (Garcia, 2015a). 
Whilst, a module trope is an object that exemplifies the 
character that it grounds (i.e. is self-exemplifying). Thus, for 
example, a particular (thickly-charactered) object is spherical 
and red in virtue of its module tropes, which are themselves 
spherical and red (i.e. exemplify sphericity and redness), and 
 
32 More on the nature of a proper part below. 
33 More on the nature of metaphysical simplicity below. 
34 I leave the account of analogy here undefined. 
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together (compresently) are parts (or constituents) of that 
object. A module tropes’ character grounding, rather than 
being de novo, can thus be taken to be some type of parthood 
(or constitution) relation (Garcia, 2015a). Furthermore, an 
additional distinction between modifier and module tropes 
is the role played by these types of tropes in causation. At a 
more specific level, it is solely module tropes, rather than 
modifier tropes, that can play any direct role in causation. As, 
for example, a modifier hotness trope cannot fulfil the role 
of being the direct cause of a burn mark that an individual 
has, as it is not itself hot; something else must thus be the 
direct cause of the burn mark (Garcia, 2015a, 643. Modifier 
tropes, in a similar manner to universals, are thus causally inert. 
However, the modular view does not have this issue, given 
that module tropes are self-exemplifying entities, resulting, 
in our example above, in a modular hotness trope being able 
to be the direct cause of the burn mark. Therefore, it is 
module tropes, and not modifier tropes, that are uniquely 
suited to be the basic terms of causation (Garcia, 2015a). 
Lastly, a trope, following Molnar (2003), is powerful in at 
least five ways: it is, first, directed—in that a powerful trope is 
directed towards some characteristic and distinctive 
manifestation.35 Second, it is independent—in that a powerful 
trope is ontologically independent from its manifestations, 
that is, it can exist when it is not being manifested. Third, it 
is actual—in that a powerful trope is an occurrent feature of 
the object that possesses it. Fourth, it is intrinsic—in that a 
powerful trope is intrinsic to its bearer.36 Fifth, it is objective— 
in that the existence of a powerful trope is not dependent on 
the existence of any conscious, observing minds. A trope, of 
 
35 An assumption is made here concerning a powerful trope being 
multi-track, rather than single-track. 
36 We can assume the notion of intrinsicality noted above. 
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a modifier or modular kind, is thus powerful in that it fulfils 
the roles of directedness, independence, actuality, intrinsicality and 
objectivity.  
Taking this concept of a powerful module trope into 
account, and applying it within a theistic context, we can 
posit that God is, first, abstract in the sense of him having 
the trait of being ‘less than the including whole’—God does 
not exhaust his ‘content’ or ‘plime’ (or is less than his 
‘content’ or ‘plime' )—where, in assuming Christian Theism, 
we take this content or plime to be the Trinity as a whole and 
its location—as its content or plime also includes the 
possibility of other tropes being collocated with him (i.e. the 
Son and the Spirit), which results in him not exhausting 
either of these things—in short, wherever God is located 
there are other tropes that are located there with him. 
Second, God is particular by him failing to abide by Leibniz’s 
Law—as, in assuming Christian Theism again—there is the 
possibility of the existence of entities—duplicates, identified 
as the Son and the Spirit—that are exactly similar in their 
intrinsic properties (i.e. their nature) to him, yet are 
numerically distinct from him. Third, God is identical to his 
qualitative nature—he is the specific character that he has, 
which is that of him being omnipotent. God’s nature is thus 
intrinsic to him, not in the sense of him possessing a further 
intrinsic ‘property’, but simply that of him being numerically 
identical to this nature. Fourth, God is a module trope, rather 
than a modifier trope, which is that of him being a 
maximally-thinly charactered object—a property in an 
analogous sense (i.e. a property*)—that is self-exemplifying 
and, in assuming Christian Theism again, serves the role of 
bestowing this characteristic upon the Trinity which he 
constitutes. Moreover, since God is a trope of a modular 
kind, he plays a direct role in causation and is thus a basic 
term of a causal relation.  Lastly, as a module trope, God is 
powerful in five ways: he is, first, directed—in that God (or 
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his action) is directed towards some characteristic and 
distinctive manifestations, such as that of creating or 
sustaining the universe. Second, he is independent—in that 
God is ontologically independent from his manifestations, 
that is, he exists when his power is not manifested.37 Third, 
he is actual—in that God is an occurrent feature of the object 
that possesses him: the Trinity. Fourth, he is intrinsic—God 
is intrinsic to his bearer, which is, again, the Trinity. 38 Fifth, 
he is objective— in that the existence of God is not dependent 
upon the existence of any conscious, observing minds. God, 
as a module trope is thus powerful in that he fulfils the roles 
 
37 Though in the grounding of the non-fundamental entities that 
fill up the layered structure of reality, God’s power will not move 
from inactivity to activity, but, instead, would always be 
manifested, given that this grounding act will be a necessary action 
that stems from God’s perfect goodness. More on this below. 
38 As Christian Theism is being assumed here, God is taken to be 
a ‘part’ of the Trinity and thus is borne by, and works through, the 
Trinity (i.e. in cooperation with the Son and the Spirit). This 
conception of the Trinity assumes the notion of the ‘monarchy of 
the Father’—the teaching that God is numerically identical to the 
Father alone—which is contrary to the common position that 
holds to God being numerically identical to the Trinity. The 
difference between these positions is more than a linguistic issue 
as proponents of the monarchy of the Father will take the existence 
of the Father to be the basis for Christian Theism being 
monotheistic—as there is ‘one Father’ there is ‘one God’—
whereas proponents of the common position would take the 
existence of the Trinity to be the basis for Christian Theism being 
monotheistic—the ‘unified collective’ (i.e. the Trinity) is the ‘one 
God’. For a further philosophical explication of the notion of the 
monarchy of the Father and its application to the Trinity, see 
(Sijuwade, 2021b). 
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of directedness, independence, actuality, intrinsicality and objectivity. 
However, he does this without any of the limitations that 
certain other powerful module tropes may have. In short, 
God is an unlimited powerful trope—an omnipotence-




Fig 1. 2 God and Module Trope Identity 
 
As an omnipotence-trope, God is a personal entity—a 
personal module trope—due to the fact that for him to 
exercise his omnipotence, he must be an entity that has a rich 
form of consciousness that enables him to perform a range 
of actions that are solely limited by logic. Thus, to ward off 
a potential objection that can be raised here, conceiving of 
God as a trope does not rob him of this personhood, given 
that he is a trope of a modular nature (i.e. a property*). 
Furthermore, given his omnipotence, God would be an 
entity that is unlimited in knowledge, presence, freedom and 
goodness.  That is, it follows from his omnipotence that God 
would, firstly, be omniscient—he would know of all true 
propositions (concerning the past and present), that they are 
true—as, if he is to be able to exercise his omnipotence, he 
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would need to know the nature of the alternative actions that 
are dependent upon what occurred in the past and what is 
presently occurring. Secondly, being omnipotent and also 
omniscient, God would be omnipresent—he would be 
cognizant of, and causally active at, every point of space—
and thus would be present to all existing things through his 
knowledge concerning them and his power to act upon 
them. Thirdly, being an omnipotence-trope, he would also 
be perfectly free—he would be free from any non-rational 
influence determining the choices that he makes—as if he is 
to be able to exercise his power in any logically possible way, 
then his power must operate without any causal limitation or 
hindrance. Fourthly, being omniscient and perfectly free, 
God would also be perfectly good—he will always perform the 
best action (or kind of action) if there is one, many good 
actions and no bad actions. That is, given God’s 
omniscience, he would know the nature of each available 
action that he can choose from and thus would possess 
knowledge of whether each action is good or bad, or is better 
than some incompatible action. Moreover, in recognising an 
action as good, God would have some motivation to 
perform that action, and in recognising an action as being 
better than another action, God would have an even greater 
motivation to perform it (Swinburne, 2016). Hence, given 
his perfect freedom, if God is situated in a scenario in which 
there is a best possible action (or best kind of action) for him 
to perform, then God will always perform that action (or 
kind of action), and if there is no best action (or kind of 
action), then God will perform a good action and no bad 
actions.39.  
 
39 Whereas in recognising an action as bad, God would have no 
motivation to perform it 
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These are the attributes—omniscience, omnipresence, 
perfect freedom and perfect goodness—that are derivable 
from the supposition that God is an omnipotence-trope. 
However, in construing God as a module-trope, we can also 
take him to be metaphysically simple, given the non-composite 
and irreducibility of a trope. And so, in conceptualising God 
in this particular way, we can see that the derivable attributes 
of God—unlike Swinburne, who takes these attributes to be 
related to God (and each other) by an ‘entailment relation’—
are in fact related to God (and each other) by a relation of 
‘numerical identity’.40 More specifically, according to the 
notion of metaphysical simplicity, God is non-composite 
and irreducible in the sense of him lacking proper parts—
where a proper part is a portion of an entity that is 
numerically distinct from it. Thus, by taking God to be 
metaphysically simple, there is no portion of God that is 
numerically distinct from him. God is a being who 
intrinsically within himself does not have any division or 
 
40 Specifically, these entities are conceived of as ‘aspects’—
qualitative differing, yet numerically identical particular ways that 
an entity is. Construing these entities in this way enables the 
primary objections against the cogency of the notion of 
metaphysical simplicity to be put to rest—as God is taken to bear 
(qualitatively differing) ‘divine aspects’, rather than ‘divine 
properties’, which enables God’s power, knowledge, goodness etc., 
to be numerically identical to him and each other—as aspects are 
numerically identical to their bearers and one another—whist still 
maintaining a qualitative distinction between them—as aspects 
qualitatively differ from their bearers and one another. God thus 
has multiple, qualitatively differing aspects that are ‘improper parts’ 
of him (i.e. numerically identical to God) rather than ‘proper parts’ 
of him (i.e. numerically distinct from God). For reasons of space, 
this account will not be further detailed. However, for a further 
explanation of this account, see (Sijuwade, 2021a). 
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ontological composition—be it spatial, temporal or 
metaphysical composition—God must be such that he does 
not have any sort of complexity involving composition. So, 
the denial of metaphysical complexity in God is thus also a 
denial of him possessing any properties as well. More 
specifically, God does not exemplify any numerically distinct 
properties (i.e. proper metaphysical parts). Since if God were 
to exemplify these properties, he would be dependent upon 
them in order to be what he is. Yet, as God cannot be 
dependent in specific this way—given that he is 
omnipotent—he thus must not be the bearer of any 
properties. Rather, any intrinsic property ‘attributable’ to 
God must be numerically identical to him. For example, if the 
intrinsic property of goodness is attributed to God, then one 
is not properly attributing to him an ontologically distinct 
property that he exemplifies. Rather, God is instead taken to 
be identical with his goodness (and all the other properties 
that are attributed to him as well). Moreover, given that God 
is identical to each of his attributes, one must also infer that 
his attributes are identical to each other due to the transitivity 
of identity. Thus, God’s identity with his goodness and his 
power entails the fact of his goodness being identical to his 
power (and, again, for all of the other properties that are 
attributed to him). Therefore, on the basis of God’s 
metaphysical simplicity, there is, firstly, no numerical 
distinction between God and his attributes and, secondly, 
there is no numerical distinction between each of God’s 
attributes as well, as can be seen through this illustration 
(where the double-headed arrows represent a numerical 
identity relation): 
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Fig 1. 3 God and Attributes Identity 
 
Theism thus postulates the existence of one, metaphysically 
simple (and personal) module trope: God, who has the single 
character of omnipotence and is numerically identical to each 
of the attributes of divinity that are rightly predicated of him. 
So construed, God is a fundamental entity, by, on the one 
hand, his metaphysical simplicity rendering him as 
independent—his non-compositeness and irreducibility would 
thus not require him to be an output of a grounding 
relation—and, on the other hand, his omnipotence 
rendering him as complete—by him possessing the ability to 
perform any logically possible action, anything that exists will 
be by him willing, or permitting, it to exist. Therefore, if God 
exists, he is rightly understood as a metaphysically simple, 
omnipotence trope that exists fundamentally. We can now 
turn our attention to fleshing out the nature of the alternative 
candidate fundamental explanations of Priority Monism and 
Priority Pluralism. 
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In the field of fundamental mereology, Jonathan Schaffer 
(2009a,b, 2010, 2013) has proposed a distinction between the 
notions of Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism. At a basic 
level, the priority monist holds to the whole being prior to 
its parts and thus takes there to be only one fundamental 
entity in the layered structure of reality. In contrast, the 
priority pluralist holds to the parts being prior to the whole 
and thus takes there to be more than one fundamental entity 
in the layered structure of reality. More precisely, according 
to Schaffer (2010, 33-37), there are two structures within 
reality: a mereological structure of whole and part and a metaphysical 
structure of prior and posterior. The latter type of structure: 
metaphysical structure, which we have been operating 
within, captures the fact of one entity being built by another 
entity, and ultimately reveals what is (or are) the fundamental 
entity (or entities) that serves as the builder(s) of all other 
reality—in short, all chains of building ultimately terminate 
in this entity (or entities). The debate between priority 
monists and pluralists, in Schaffer’s (2010) thought, is thus 
concerning the right correlation between this mereological 
order of whole and part and the metaphysical order of 
priority and posteriority. More specifically, it concerns the 
identification of what is fundamental among existing 
concrete entities. As priority monists and pluralists both hold 
to there being a maximally actual concrete object—the 
material Cosmos—of which all other actual concrete, 
material objects (e.g. planets, pebbles and particles etc.) are 
proper parts. The assumption is thus made on both sides that 
there is a Cosmos, that it has proper parts and that it is not 
identical to any plurality of its proper parts (i.e. composition 
is not identity). Thus, the central distinction between these 
two positions centres on how to carve up the Cosmos (Schaffer, 
2010, 42). Focusing first on Priority Monism, adherents of 
this view see the correct way to carve up the Cosmos as that 
of leaving the whole uncut. Thus, on this view, there is solely 
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one fundamental actual concrete object: the Cosmos itself. 
Importantly, however, and in distinction from existence 
monism—the view that solely the Cosmos exists and nothing 
else—there are many other concrete, material objects; yet, 
these objects exist only in a derivative manner as proper parts 
of the one fundamental entity that is the Cosmos. Thus, in 
providing a precisification of this view, we can state the 
monistic position succinctly as such: 
 
(24)  (Priority Monism) The whole, identified 
as the Cosmos, is the single, fundamental 
concrete object that is ontological prior to 
all other actual concrete material objects, 
which are its proper parts. 
 
Now, it is not built into the notion of Priority Monism that 
the single fundamental entity: the Cosmos, has any particular 
nature. Rather, the notion so characterised is strictly a 
numerical thesis concerning the number of fundamental 
entities—which, for Priority Monism, is that of there being 
one. However, a specific way of further detailing the nature 
of this fundamental entity has been provided by Schaffer 
(2009b).41 In this particular construal of Priority Monism, the 
nature of the Cosmos—the fusion of all actual concrete, 
material objects—is, according to Schaffer (2009b, 132-133), 
to be identified as the general-relativistic spacetime manifold. And 
material objects—the proper parts of the Cosmos—are to 
be identified as regions of spacetime. Thus, the spacetime 
manifold that is the Cosmos is a single substance that 
 
41 Thus, at a more specific level, the candidate explanation that will 
be assessed below is the more robust version provided by 
Schaffer—rather than a more bare-bones version of Priority 
Monism. 
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instantiates properties directly—that is, without any mediation 
of material objects. Rather, the properties are ‘pinned down’ 
onto the spatiotemporal substance. The Cosmos thus 
possesses proper parts—identified as spacetime regions 
instantiating properties—that it is more fundamental than, 
which renders these proper parts as derivative and non-
fundamental entities that depend upon the Cosmos for their 
existence.  
Turning our attention to Priority Pluralism, adherents of 
this view see the correct way to carve up the Cosmos as that 
of cutting it up into smaller pieces. Specifically, this position of 
Priority Pluralism is a conjunction of the numerical thesis 
concerning how many fundamental entities there are—there 
being at least two fundamental entities—and the partialistic 
thesis that the Cosmos is non-fundamental (Schaffer, 2010, 
43). Thus, in providing a precisification of this view, we can 
state the pluralistic position succinctly as such: 
 
(25)  (Priority Pluralism) There exists many 
fundamental entities, which are the 
ontologically prior proper parts of the 
Cosmos and all other actual concrete 
objects. 
 
Now, again, it is not built into the notion of Priority 
Pluralism that the numerous fundamental entities that are 
taken to exist have any particular nature. Rather, the notion 
so characterised, as with Priority Monism, is strictly a 
numerical thesis concerning the number of fundamental 
entities—which, for Priority Pluralism, is that of there being 
many. However, a specific way of further detailing the nature 
of these fundamental entities has been provided by Peter 
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Simons (2020).42 This particular construal of Priority 
Pluralism is that of Atomism—the view in which the 
fundamental concrete objects are mereological atoms. 
Priority Pluralism, construed in this atomistic way, posits that 
all derivative entities—including the Cosmos—are grounded 
in the collection of mereological atoms—which, following 
Simons (2020), can be conceptualised as indivisible (point-
particle like) module tropes.43 The fundamental layer of 
reality is thus an indivisible (because un-extended) collection 
of (point-particle like) module tropes that support the 
existence of all other non-fundamental entities. The Cosmos, 
is itself a non-fundamental entity and thus can be cut into 
mereologically minimal slices.  
Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, so construed, are 
thus exhaustive and exclusive positions due to the holding, 
of what Schaffer (2018, §3.1) terms, the tiling constraint. The 
tiling constraint is the conjunction of the following two 
conditions (where we can take the predicate ‘F’ to denote the 
property of being a fundamental concrete object, and the 
letter ‘u’ to refer to the Cosmos): 
 
(26)  (Covering) Sum: x(Fx) = u  
 
42 Thus, again, at a more specific level, the candidate explanation 
that will be assessed below is the more robust version provided by 
Simons—rather than a more bare-bones version of Priority 
Pluralism. 
43 Simons does not explicitly term his account a ‘priority pluralist’ 
account, nor does he term the tropes that feature in his account 
‘module tropes’. However, his atomistic account is clearly one that 
affirms the central tenets of Priority Pluralism and, given the 
distinction that was made earlier between modifier and module 
tropes, the concept of a trope that features in Simons’ account is 
certainly that of the latter, rather than that of the former. 
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(27)  (No Overlap) (∀x)(∀y) ((Fx&Fy& x≠y) ⊃ ∼(∃z) 
(Pzx & Pzy)). 
 
The first condition of the tiling constraint: (Covering), 
expresses the requirement within fundamental mereology 
that the sum of all fundamental entities is the Cosmos as a 
whole—there is no portion of the Cosmos which is thus left 
uncovered. The second condition of the tiling constraint: 
(No Overlap), expresses the requirement that the 
fundamental entities are not to have any common parts—
thus, these entities are mereologically disjoint. The picture 
that is given by these two conditions is that of the 
fundamental entities tiling the cosmos in the sense that they 
partition or cover every portion of reality without them 
overlapping (Schaffer, 2018, §3.1).  
So, for Priority Monism, there is one and only 
fundamental entity: the whole Cosmos, which is prior to its 
proper parts—all other existing concrete entities. Whereas, 
for Priority Pluralism, there are many fundamental entities, 
each of which is a proper part of the Cosmos, identified as 
mereological atoms—un-extended (point particle like) 
module tropes. We can illustrate the position expressed by 
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Fig 1. 4 Priority Monism and Pluralism Structure 
 
Thus, to reiterate a key point, the primary disagreement 
between Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism does not 
concern the existence of the Cosmos, material objects or 
mereological atoms—these are all shared assumptions. 
Rather, given the tiling constraint, and the fact that Priority 
Monism is equivalent to Fu—the Cosmos being a 
fundamental entity—and Priority Pluralism being equivalent 
to ∼Fu— the Cosmos not being a fundamental entity—
these two positions are simply an exhaustive and exclusive 
way to carve up reality—stick with monism, and you keep 
fundamental reality intact and whole, or go with pluralism, 
and you cut fundamental reality down to its smallest pieces. 
Thus, the Cosmos, or the collection of mereological atoms, 
if they exist in the manner so construed, exist as fundamental 
entities—they are independent and complete—through the tiling 
constraint enabling them to cover all of reality. Taking all of 
these things into account, these are the three candidate 
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fundamental explanations of our explanatory target. Now, to 
determine which of these options is to be deemed as the 
fundamental explanation and terminus in explanation for the 
existence of the various non-fundamental entities within the 
layered structure of reality, we must assess and compare the 
manner in which these explanations fulfil our inductive 
criteria. This assessment will now be done by focusing first, 
again, on Theism and then turning our attention to Priority 
Monism and Pluralism. 
 
 
4.2 Assessment of the Candidates 
 
Theism has predictive power, in respect to our 
explanatory target, to the extent to which we can attribute to 
God an intention to bring about the existence of non-
fundamental entities. Plausibly it is the best kind of action for 
God to bring about these types of entities, given the unique 
goodness of this action. Specifically, the performance of this 
action is a unique good due to the holding of the Diffusiveness 
Principle, which can be stated as follows: 
(28)  (Diffusiveness) Goodness is necessarily diffusive of 
itself.  
 
At a general level, according to the Diffusiveness 
Principle, goodness requires something other than itself as a 
manifestation of itself. Hence, a good being will inevitably 
bring about other good things. Thus, as it is better to exist 
than not to exist—existence is a good thing—God, as 
Norman Kretzmann (1991, 223) writes, ‘necessarily (though 
with the freedom associated with counterfactual choice) wills 
the being of something other than himself’. In other words, 
as perfect goodness is an essential property of God and self-
diffusiveness is essential to goodness itself, the existence of 
other entities outside of God will be an inevitable 
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consequence of God’s nature. Restating this within our 
metaphysical context, God—who is perfectly good—must 
diffuse his goodness by ‘grounding’ the existence of all things 
outside of himself. The existence of other, non-fundamental 
(i.e. dependent or grounded) entities will be the necessary 
result of God’s intention to produce good things. Thus, 
God’s action of ‘grounding’ the existence of non-
fundamental entities is a product of his nature that stems 
from him necessarily, yet wilfully, spreading his goodness in 
this creative act.44 Therefore, as God’s (perfectly good) 
intentions are always realised, if there is a God, we can 
expect—with a level of certainty—that there will also be 
non-fundamental entities that exist alongside him.45 Theism 
thus fulfils Criterion (i) to a very high level. 
Corresponding to this, we can also see the central claim 
provided by Theism—that there is a God, a metaphysically 
simple, omnipotence-trope—fits very well with our 
background knowledge as it posits the existence of certain a 
type of entity—a trope—that is at the foundation of 
contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, tropes are a 
 
44 That is, this diffusive act is not an ‘impersonal emanation’ of 
God but a personal act that include, firstly, his powers—that 
enable him to ground the existence of all other non-fundamental 
entities, secondly, his beliefs—that grounding the existence of 
other fundamental entities will diffuse his goodness—and, thirdly, 
his purposes—to diffuse his goodness by grounding the existence 
of all other, non-fundamental entities. 
45 An objection that can be raised here is how God’s perfect 
freedom can be preserved given the Diffusiveness Principle. Well, 
in answer to this, following Kretzmann (1991, 223), we can say that 
God’s freedom of choice is solely confined to his selection of what 
possibilities to actualise—God is necessitated as regards to whether 
to ground anything, yet he is perfectly free in regards to what he is 
to ground.   
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standard feature of most current day ontologies—where 
influential metaphysicians such as D.C. Williams (1953, 
1986), Keith Campbell (1990), Jonathan Schaffer (2001), 
Peter Simons (1994), Anna-Sofia Maurin (2002, 2018), 
Douglas Ehring (2011), Kris McDaniel (2001) and Michael 
Loux (2015), all have utilised the concept of a trope within 
their ontological system. Moreover, tropes do not only 
feature in the ontological systems of various metaphysicians, 
but are also plausible options for dealing with various issues 
within contemporary philosophy. That is, tropes, amongst 
other things, find their use in the metaphysics of properties 
by providing a means for one to affirm a form of realism 
(Markku Keinänen et al., 2016), or, in the metaphysics of 
persistence and identity by providing a basis for the notions 
of endurance and perdurance (Benovsky, 2013), or, in the 
philosophy of physics by providing a philosophical basis for 
quantum theory and the Standard Model of elementary 
particles (Morganti, 2009). Plausibly, the belief in the 
existence of tropes is widespread in contemporary 
metaphysics, and thus the postulation of the existence of 
God, identified as a (module) trope, meshes well with other 
theories from the neighbouring fields within contemporary 
metaphysics.46 Theism thus fulfils Criterion (ii) to a 
significant level.  
 
46 One could raise the objection here that the notion of a ‘personal’ 
trope is not widespread in contemporary metaphysics, and thus 
Theism does not mesh well with our background knowledge. In 
response to this issue, one can emphasise the importance of the 
type/token distinction for the Criterion of Background 
Knowledge. That is, for the postulation of the existence of an 
entity to be such as to fit within our background knowledge, this 
entity simply needs to be of a class (i.e. a type) of entities that are 
taken to exist within other fields; rather than it being a particular 
instance of this class (i.e. a token) that is regularly seen to be 
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Furthermore, Theism is also a very simple explanation, 
or, in fact, the simplest possible personal fundamental 
explanation, as it explains the various phenomena of reality 
in terms of the powerful action of one personal entity: 
God—rather than many personal entities—and thus it is an 
explanation that is quantitatively simple—it is simpler than any 
other polytheistic based personal explanation. However, 
Theism is not only quantitively simple, but it is also 
qualitatively simple, in the sense that it postulates the existence 
of the simplest kind of personal entity. As God is 
metaphysically simple, and thus lacks proper parts, God has 
the fewest number and kind of properties possible: zero. As, 
instead of possessing properties, each attribution made of 
God is numerically identical to him—God's attributes are 
God himself. There is thus no further explanation that is 
needed to be provided for why God has the properties that 
he does—as he does not have any properties. Furthermore, 
as Theism identifies God as a trope (of a modular kind), it 
 
duplicated (as if this were in fact the case, then one would not be 
able to make discoveries of new instances of a given class, which 
one clearly can). Thus, even though God is a personal module 
trope—that is, he is able to be ‘picked out’ from the class of tropes 
by being personal (amongst other things)—as tropes are a class of 
entities that are widely taken to exist in other fields within 
contemporary metaphysics (outside of the field of analytic 
theology), the postulation of the existence of God is a postulation 
of a type of entity that does in fact fit within our background 
knowledge—even if he is a unique instance of this kind. Whereas, 
for example, if one were to assume Swinburne’s (2016, 103-126) 
construal of God as an omnipresent spirit, God would indeed be a 
type of entity that does not fit within our background knowledge, 
as spirits are not widely taken to exist in other fields within 
contemporary metaphysics (outside of the field of analytic 
theology). 
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posits the existence of an entity of the fewest number of 
kinds: one. Assuming the correctness of ‘Classical Trope 
Theory’, tropes allow one to affirm the existence of one 
ontological kind or category: the kind or category ‘trope’, 
with the other kinds or categories of ‘substance’ and 
‘universals’ being denied.47 Thus, by Theism positing the 
existence of God, one only has to be committed to the 
existence of one ontological kind or category, and thus this 
type of fundamental explanation allows one to continue to 
have a very parsimonious ontology. Theism is thus 
quantitatively and qualitatively the simplest possible 
explanation, due to the fact that it postulates the fewest 
number and kind of entities: one, with the fewest number 
and kind of properties: zero. Theism thus fulfils Criterion 
(iv) as well. 
Therefore, within our context of analysis, Theism 
provides the simplest kind of personal fundamental 
explanation that fits with our background knowledge and 
leads us to expect (with a level of certainty) the existence of 
all other non-fundamental entities. Theism thus fulfils all of 
the relevant components of our inductive criteria. The 
question that now presents itself is: do the other possible 
alternative fundamental explanations of Priority Monism and 
Priority Pluralism do so as well? 
For Priority Monism, there is a postulation made 
concerning the existence of a fundamental entity: the 
Cosmos. This entity is identified as the spacetime manifold, 
with all other existing material objects being identified as 
 
47 This is due to the fact of a trope being able to play the role of a 
substance—through forming a compresent bundle with other 
tropes—and universal—through the process of abstraction 
enabling one to fictionally treat a class of trope as universal-like 
entities. 
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spacetime regions that are dependent, proper parts of the 
Cosmos. Whereas, for Priority Pluralism, there is a 
postulation made concerning the existence of a collection of 
mereological atoms, identified as (point-particle like) module 
tropes, that make up, as proper parts, the larger existing 
concrete objects, and thus ultimately the Cosmos. For 
Priority Monism, there is thus the postulation of the 
existence of one non-fundamental entity, and for Priority 
Pluralism, there is the postulation of many fundamental 
entities. In regards to the predictive power of both 
explanations, it is clear that this would be significantly high, 
due to the fact that the existence of non-fundamental entities 
is entailed by the existence of the Cosmos and the collection 
of mereological atoms. As, on the one hand, it is inbuilt into 
Priority Monism that the Cosmos is the sole fundamental 
entity, with all other existing concrete objects being non-
fundamental entities that are proper parts of the Cosmos. 
Thus, we can expect with a level of certainty that if the single, 
fundamental Cosmos exists, then the various non-
fundamental entities—its spacetime regions and proper 
parts—will exist as well. Likewise, on the other hand, given 
the plausibility of the principle of unrestricted composition—the 
thesis that every plurality of objects compose something—it 
is also inbuilt into Priority Pluralism that the collection of 
mereological atoms are the only fundamental entities, and 
thus all other existing concrete objects are non-fundamental 
entities that are composed of these various atoms—the non-
fundamental entities are decomposable into these very 
atoms.48 Thus, we can also expect with a level of certainty 
 
48 The holding of the principle of unrestricted composition is 
important if a priority pluralist is to transition in their argument 
from the existence of the mereological atoms to these atoms 
composing other objects. However, despite its plausibility, the 
principle of unrestricted composition is indeed controversial, and 
   Fundamentality and the Existence of God 63 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
that if the many fundamental mereological atoms exist, then 
the various non-fundamental entities will exist as well. Both 
of these explanations thus fulfil Criterion (i) very well. 
Furthermore, it is quite clear that Priority Monism and 
Priority Pluralism fit well with our background knowledge, 
given that the postulation of the Cosmos, for the former, and 
mereological atoms, for the latter, does not seem to conflict 
with anything else within the fields of contemporary 
metaphysics. Rather, though it is a debated thesis,49 the 
notion of substantivalism—the position that the Cosmos is a 
spacetime substance that is non-derivative (i.e. 
fundamental)—which is a thesis that is at the heart of the 
particular conception of Priority Monism assumed here—is 
taken by various philosophers to be a potentially correct 
understanding of the nature of the Cosmos.50 Furthermore, 
as noted previously, the concept of a trope is also a widely 
 
so a proponent of Priority Pluralism will need to support this 
principle if this position is to be taken alongside Theism and 
Priority Monism as a candidate fundamental explanation that has 
some level of predictive power. Nevertheless, in order to retain 
Priority Pluralism as a potential candidate for our explanatory 
target, the veracity of this principle will be assumed rather than 
argued for here—which is not problematic given that this article 
focuses on defending Theism rather than that of Priority Pluralism. 
49 As is (nearly) every notion in contemporary philosophy. 
50 More specifically, the particular conception of substantivalism 
that is at the centre of the version of Priority Monism here is that 
of super-substantivalism—the view that the Cosmos is a spacetime 
substance that is the only fundamental entity. Nevertheless, the 
notion of substantivalism is at the core of this specific position, 
which is simply an additional numerical thesis. For a further 
explanation of substantivalism and the various conceptions of it 
on offer, see (Huggett and Hoefer, 2015). 
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used notion within the various fields of contemporary 
metaphysics. Therefore, Criterion (ii) is clearly fulfilled to a 
sufficient level by these two explanations as well. Thus, the 
question now is: do these two explanations meet the final 
Criterion—the Criterion of Simplicity—as well? The answer 
to this is quite clearly no. As Priority Monism is quantitatively 
simple, but fails to be qualitatively simple, and Priority 
Pluralism is qualitatively simple, but fails to be quantitatively 
simple. That is, on the one hand, Priority Monism postulates 
the existence of one fundamental concrete object: the 
Cosmos, and thus postulates the existence of the fewest 
number of entities—one. Yet, it does not postulate the fewest 
kinds of entities or the fewest number or kinds of properties. 
That is, for the former, it fails to do this by assuming a two-
category ontology—substance and attribute/tropes—where 
the Cosmos is the one fundamental substance that instantiates 
various universals, or is constituted by various tropes. 
Therefore, if one is thus to affirm the veracity of Priority 
Monism, then one must also affirm the veracity of this type 
of ontology, and therefore be saddled with the issues that are 
present within this type of ontology (such as Bradley's 
Regress).51 Moreover, for the latter, as the Cosmos is the 
spacetime manifold that has material objects as proper parts 
of it in the form of spacetime regions, the properties of these 
material objects are ‘pinned’ onto the Cosmos itself. The 
Cosmos thus instantiates a nearly infinite number of 
properties. The Cosmos, as construed in this way, would 
thus be many propertied, which renders Priority Monism as 
 
51 This conclusion, however, is only reached by the version of 
Priority Monism that has been assumed throughout this article. I 
thus leave it as an open issue for further research whether other 
conceptions of Priority Monism (such as Priority Monism 
combined with nominalism) must also reach this conclusion. 
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qualitatively complex rather than simple. On the other hand, 
we have Priority Pluralism which postulates the existence of 
many fundamental objects—many mereological atoms, that, 
as module tropes would be metaphysically simple—and thus, 
it posits the existence of the fewest number and kind of 
properties—zero properties. Yet, as there needs to be a near-
infinite number of existing mereological atoms for the 
composition of the variety of actual material objects. There 
are thus many mereological atoms, which renders Priority 
Pluralism as quantitatively complex rather than simple. 
These two explanations both fail to fulfil Criterion (iv) and 
thus together posit explanations that predict the data at hand 




4.3 Comparison of the Candidates 
 
In regards to the occurrence of our explanatory target—
the existence of non-fundamental entities—we have three 
candidate fundamental explanations: Theism, Priority 
Monism and Priority Pluralism. All of these explanations fit 
with our background knowledge and yield (or predict) the 
data to an extremely high level. However, what we find with 
two of these explanations: Priority Monism and Priority 
Pluralism, is that there is a postulation made concerning the 
nature of certain fundamental entities—the Cosmos or 
collection of mereological atoms—that is complex and thus 
less simple than the postulation made by Theism. Theism, as 
noted above, postulates the existence of one fundamental 
entity: God. This single fundamental entity is a 
metaphysically simple omnipotence trope (who is identical 
to each of the attributes ascribed to him) and thus 
instantiates zero properties. Theism, unlike Priority Pluralism, 
postulates the fewest number of entities—one module trope, 
 Joshua R. Sijuwade 66 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2021. 
rather than many—and, unlike Priority Monism, it postulates 
the fewest kind of entities—one kind: trope, rather than (at 
least) two kinds: substance and attributes—and the fewest 
number and kind of properties—zero properties, rather than 
many. Thus, in comparison to Priority Monism and Priority 
Pluralism, Theism is a simpler explanation of explanatory 
target. In other words, Theism fulfils our inductive criteria 
to a greater extent than the alternative inanimate 
fundamental explanations. And thus, given this, we have a 
good reason to take these latter explanations as solely being 
full metaphysical explanations (i.e. metaphysical explanations 
that fully explain the data, yet have a further synchronic 
explanation for them), rather than fundamental explanations 
(i.e. metaphysical explanations that fully explain the data and 
do not have a further synchronic explanation for them), that 
can each serve as a terminus in explanation for the existence 
of non-fundamental entities. More specifically, as noted 
previously, if one can formulate an explanation that allows 
us to have a metaphysical explanation with a greater 
fulfilment of our inductive criteria—in this case, a simpler 
explanation—than the existing options, without also there 
being a corresponding loss in the fulfilment of any other of 
the components of the criteria, such as fit with background 
knowledge or predictive power, then we have good reason 
to adopt that explanation as being the fundamental 
explanation for our explanatory target. Theism, in 
comparison to Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism, is the 
simplest explanation, fitting with our background 
knowledge, that leads us to expect the existence of the non-
fundamental entities that are part of the layered structure of 
reality.  
Importantly, however, taking Theism to be the 
fundamental explanation of our explanatory target does not 
mean that we need to do away with Priority Monism or 
Priority Pluralism as, in fact, the central theses of these 
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notions can still be affirmed—which, for Priority Monism, is 
that of the whole being prior to its parts, and thus 
metaphysical explanation dangling downwards, and, for 
Priority Pluralism, is that of the parts being prior to the 
whole, and thus metaphysical explanation snaking upwards. 
Theism thus postulates the existence of a single fundamental 
entity: God, who, if Priority Monism is true, grounds the 
Cosmos—and thus explanation dangles downward from 
him through the Cosmos to everything else. Or, if Priority 
Pluralism is true, God is the sole fundamental who grounds 
the collection of mereological atoms—and thus explanation 
snakes upwards from him through the mereological atoms to 
everything else. Therefore, given this, within the scientific or 
categorial layered view of reality that was detailed previously, 
we do, in fact, have good reason to descend further down 
the chain and levels, beyond that of physics category,52 to a 
stopping point within the theology category. This descent, and 
the role that God plays within a priority monist or priority 





52 Which will include either Priority Monism or Priority Pluralism 
within that category. 
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Fig 1.5 Layered and Theistic Priority  
Monism and Pluralism Structure 
 
 
By making this descent to the theology category, we reach 
our terminus in explanation for the existence of non-
fundamental entities. That is, God, the entity studied by 
theology, is thus the sole fundamental entity within the layered 
structure of reality by him not being the output of any 
building relation, in that nothing ‘presses upwards’ on him, 
rather he presses upwards on all other (non-fundamental) 
entities. More precisely, God fulfils the following roles as the 
sole entity that exists in the fundamental layer of reality: 
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IndependentG (Ungrounded) CompleteG (Ground) 
Directed  God does not rank below any 
other entity in the hierarchical 
structure of reality. 
God ranks higher than any 
other entity in the 
hierarchical structure of 
reality within the specific 
world in which he exists. 
Necessitating  The existence of any other 
entity does not necessitate the 
existence of God. 
God’s existence necessitates 
the existence of every other 
entity within the specific 
world in which he exists. 
Generative  God’s existence and intrinsic 
nature are not fixed by the 
existence and intrinsic nature of 
any other entity. 
God’s existence and 
intrinsic nature fixes the 
existence and intrinsic 
nature of every other entity 
within the specific world in 
which he exists. 
Explanatory  God’s existence, at a specific 
time, is not explained by the 
existence of any other entity. 
God’s existence, at a specific 
time, explains the existence 
of all other entities within 
the specific world in which 
he exists. 
Causal  God is not a grounded effect of 
any other entity and thus is not 
the output of a Structural 
Equation Model. 
God is the metaphysical 
cause of all other entities 
that are grounded effects, 
and thus is the input of a 
Structural Equation Model 
within the specific world in 
which he exists. 
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God thus acts as the fundamental source of all of reality—
his existence is sufficient for the existence of all other, non-
fundamental entities at any given time, ultimately backing a 
synchronic metaphysical explanation for them existing as 
they do.  The existence of God thus provides a sufficient 
fundamental explanation for there being non-fundamental 
entities, rather than none. And, importantly, we do not need 
to search for a further explanation beyond God, as being a 
metaphysically simple entity that exists fundamentally  (i.e. is 
independent and complete), his existence is inexplicable, and 
his building agency, with the operation of the laws of 
metaphysics (i.e. grounding principles), necessitates the 
existence of all other non-fundamental entities. The layered 
structure of reality terminates in God, and God alone. And 
thus, given this, we have a successful abductive argument for 
the existence of God, by the postulation of his existence 
providing us with the best, or more specifically, the only true 
fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-
fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the 
layered structure of reality. We thus have one more good 





In conclusion, in section one an explanatory framework was 
established, which provided us with the needed tools: an 
inductive criteria, to assess the potential worth of a given 
metaphysical explanation. In section two, our explanatory 
target was detailed: that of the existence of non-fundamental 
entities, rather than none. And the nature of this explanatory 
target was further elucidated within a cetin metaphysical 
picture concerning the layered structure of reality. In section 
three, candidates for a fundamental explanation of our 
explanatory target were detailed and assessed for their 
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fulfilment of our inductive criteria, these candidates were: 
Theism, Priority Monism and Priority Pluralism. In this 
assessment, Theism was shown to be an explanation that 
fulfils the inductive criteria to a greater level than the 
alternative explanations of Priority Monism and Priority 
Pluralism. Thus, Theism provides the simplest explanation, 
fitting with our background knowledge, that leads us to 
expect the existence of non-fundamental entities, when 
otherwise they would not be expected to exist. Theism is the 
sole true fundamental explanation of our explanatory target. 
And, therefore, given the existence of non-fundamental 
entities, we thus have one more good (abductive) reason to 
believe that God, the single, absolutely fundamental entity 
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